Settings to change: they are weaker than the baseline, or only hold because of a Windows default.
Failures (10)
These settings are weaker than the baseline recommends. Fix them in the order each card shows: several need an audit step first, and skipping it can lock users out.
DEVORE-01-NTLM-LMCOMPATIBILITYLEVEL Require NTLMv2 (LAN Manager authentication level)
HIGHFailstage: not startedCONFLICTCan lock people out
NTLMv1 and LM responses can be cracked or relayed quickly, so anyone who captures one can sign in as that user.
Microsoft changes this default: October 2026. Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 switch BlockNtlmv1SSO to enforce by default, blocking NTLMv1 credentials for signed-in users (unless Credential Guard is on). Microsoft
Found: 1 in Sample Workstation Baseline GPO; 5 in Sample Override GPOTarget: at least 5 (step 1: at least 3)Applies to: 50 of 50 computers
Conflict — enforced-override
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Precedence is unresolved. Confirm the effective value with gpresult /h or the Group Policy Results (RSoP) wizard on a representative machine before changing or trusting any of these settings.
GPOs involved (2)
| GPO | Value | Rollout step | Delivered by | Enforced link |
|---|
Sample Workstation Baseline GPO
CN={11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local | 1 | not started | security template (policy) | no |
Sample Override GPO
CN={22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local | 5 | enforced | security template (policy) | yes |
Who still uses NTLMv1?
This scan reads Group Policy, not event logs. To see which machines and accounts would break, run aditor-cli ntlm-script > export.ps1, list your domain controllers and servers in it, run it (read-only; Event Log Readers is enough), then scan again with --ntlm-evidence ntlmv1-evidence.csv.
Next: step 1: set it to 3.
Before enforcing, check: Look for event 4624 with LmPackageName = 'NTLM V1' on member servers and endpoints, ignoring ANONYMOUS LOGON. Event 4776 on DCs doesn't record the NTLM version, so it can't be used for this.
- IN STAGES: don't set domain controllers to 5 until every device is at 3 or higher. At 5, a DC treats NTLMv1 attempts as bad passwords, which locks accounts out (Devore saw 46 failed logons from one NTLMv1 SMB connection).
- TATTOOING: the value lives outside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies, so if you later set the policy back to 'Not Defined', the old value stays on each device and has to be cleared there.
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 3 first. Machines send only NTLMv2. This already changes behaviour: a device or server that only accepts LM or NTLMv1, such as an old NAS or copier, stops working with them. Domain controllers still accept anything until step 2.
Step 2: only then set it to 5. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (2)
- Levels 0-3 control what a client sends; levels 4-5 control what a server or DC accepts.
- Credential Guard stops a machine using NTLMv1 with signed-in users' credentials, whatever this setting says. What servers and domain controllers accept is still decided by this setting. Changing it needs no reboot.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Network security: LAN Manager authentication level |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\LmCompatibilityLevel |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 4 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | gte |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | 3 |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 5 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 1 lists levels 0-5 and what each means (3 = Send NTLMv2 response only; 5 = Refuse LM & NTLM). |
|---|
Found (this scan)
| Value found | Type | Rollout step | Set by GPO | Delivered by | Enforced link / link path |
|---|
1 | REG_DWORD | not started | Sample Workstation Baseline GPO
CN={11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values] | security template (policy) | no |
5 | REG_DWORD | enforced | Sample Override GPO
CN={22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values] | security template (policy) | yesOU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced)
|
Scan notes
- Precedence is not resolved (v1): every GPO that sets this key is listed. Check the conflict field before treating a single GPO's value as effective.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
- 2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 1
DEVORE-05-LDAP-CHANNEL-BINDING Domain controller LDAP channel binding
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisCan lock people out
Channel binding stops an attacker relaying someone's LDAPS sign-in to a domain controller.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 2 (step 1: exactly 1)
Next: step 1: set it to 1.
Before enforcing, check: Events 3074 and 3075 in the Directory Service log (Server 2019 and 2022 with the 2023–24 updates, diagnostic logging at 2 or higher). Event 3039 means a bind already failed.
- AUDIT FIRST: with diagnostic logging ('16 LDAP Interface Events') at 2 or higher, event 3074 records a client whose token would fail validation and 3075 a client that sent no token. Both are logged on Windows Server 2022 from the November 2023 update and Server 2019 from the January 2024 update. Event 3039 records a bind that actually failed. Source: Microsoft KB4520412, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-2023-and-2024-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Domain controllers check the channel binding token from every client that sends one, and still accept clients that send none. That already rejects clients whose token doesn't match, which is common behind load balancers that terminate TLS, so test first.
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (2)
- Devore gives the setting names (Never / When supported / Always) but not the numbers. The 0/1/2 mapping is the widely used one from KB4034879; confirm it against a baseline source.
- Unset means off. It only affects SASL binds over TLS. Load balancers that terminate or bridge TLS break channel binding, and a load-balanced name (VIP FQDN) must be in the DC certificate's SAN.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters\LdapEnforceChannelBinding |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | domain-controllers |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 3 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | equals |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | 1 |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 2 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 5 gives the registry path and the setting names, but not the numbers. The mapping 0/1/2 = Never / When supported / Always is Microsoft's, from KB4034879. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- The value isn't set, so channel binding is off (it has no default) and SASL binds over TLS aren't tied to the TLS channel.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 5
DEVORE-06-SMB-CLIENT-SIGNING-ALWAYS SMB client always requires signing
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisPilot first
Without SMB signing, an attacker can relay a captured sign-in to a file server and act as that user.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 1
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (3)
- NOT THE LEGACY SETTING: this isn't 'Digitally sign communications (if server agrees)' (EnableSecuritySignature). That's a different, weaker setting that only affects SMBv1: Microsoft says SMB2 and later ignore it, and recommends against it. A GPO setting EnableSecuritySignature = 1 doesn't satisfy this check, which doesn't read that value.
- '(always)' applies to every SMB version and drops the session when the other side can't sign.
- Windows 11 24H2 and Server 2025 require SMB signing by default, so on those an unset value doesn't necessarily mean unsigned traffic. It's still not enforced by policy, which is what this check looks for.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always) |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManWorkstation\Parameters\RequireSecuritySignature |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 4 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | equals |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 1 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Microsoft, 'Overview of Server Message Block signing in Windows', for 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)': registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManWorkstation\Parameters, value RequireSecuritySignature, REG_DWORD, 0 (disable) or 1 (enable): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview. That 'always' means signing is required is from Microsoft, 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-digitally-sign-communications-always. The key is written as Microsoft writes it ('LanMan', capital M). Real GPOs spell the service name several ways, and ADitor matches it regardless of case. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- No GPO requires SMB signing on the client side, so outbound SMB is signed only when the server requires it. ADitor doesn't assume a Windows default here: the policy's documented default is Disabled, but Windows 11 24H2 and Server 2025 require signing by default, so what an unset value means depends on the Windows version, which a GPO scan can't see.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 6
DEVORE-06-SMB-SERVER-SIGNING-ALWAYS SMB server always requires signing
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisPilot first
Without SMB signing, an attacker can relay a captured sign-in to this server and act as that user.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 1
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (3)
- NOT THE LEGACY SETTING: this isn't 'Digitally sign communications (if client agrees)' (EnableSecuritySignature). That's a different, weaker setting that only affects SMBv1: Microsoft says SMB2 and later ignore it, and recommends against it. A GPO setting EnableSecuritySignature = 1 doesn't satisfy this check, which doesn't read that value.
- Devore is explicit that this belongs on endpoints and member servers too. Third-party appliances and multifunction printers are the usual devices that can't sign.
- Domain controllers already require SMB signing for SYSVOL and NETLOGON; this check is about the policy that requires it everywhere else.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always) |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters\RequireSecuritySignature |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 4 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | equals |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 1 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Microsoft, 'Overview of Server Message Block signing in Windows', for 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)': registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters, value RequireSecuritySignature, REG_DWORD, 0 (disable) or 1 (enable): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview. That 'always' means signing is required is from Microsoft, 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always. The key is written as Microsoft writes it ('LanMan', capital M). Real GPOs spell the service name several ways, and ADitor matches it regardless of case. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- No GPO requires SMB signing on the server side, so inbound SMB is signed only when the client requires it. ADitor doesn't assume a Windows default here: Microsoft's defaults table gives Enabled for domain controllers but Disabled for member servers and clients, so the default depends on the machine's role.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 6
DEVORE-07-UNCONSTRAINED-DELEGATION No accounts other than domain controllers have unconstrained delegation
HIGHFailstage: not startedread from the directoryPilot first
A computer with unconstrained delegation keeps the tickets of everyone who connects to it, admins included, so taking it over can mean taking over the domain.
Found: 1 listed: APPSRV01$Target: none
Next: fix the 1 listed on the card.
- IN STAGES: changing delegation can break the services that depend on it. Find out what each listed account delegates to before changing it, and change one at a time.
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
More notes (2)
- Only writable domain controllers are excluded. Read-only domain controllers don't carry this flag by design, so one that has it is listed, as is any user account, whatever its primary group.
- Disabled accounts are listed and marked: re-enabling one brings the exposure back.
Evidence and technical detail
| Directory check | unconstrained-delegation |
|---|
| Scope | domain-root |
|---|
| Check type | directory-state |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Expected | nothing found by the directory query |
|---|
| Where the rule comes from | Devore Part 7: accounts trusted for delegation to any service (userAccountControl TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, 0x80000) should be moved to constrained or resource-based constrained delegation. Writable domain controllers carry this flag by design and are excluded, recognised by their account type (a computer account with SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT, 0x2000), not by primary group. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
| Name | Type | Why it is listed | DN |
|---|
| APPSRV01$ | computer | computer trusted for delegation to any service | CN=APPSRV01,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=local |
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 7
DEVORE-06-LLMNR-DISABLE Turn off LLMNR (multicast name resolution)
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedLow risk
Found: 0 in Sample Workstation LLMNR GPOTarget: exactly 0Applies to: 40 of 50 computers
✓ Done on 40 of 50 computers: OU=Workstations,DC=test,DC=local (40).
✗ Not yet on 10: OU=Servers,DC=test,DC=local (8), OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (2). What that leaves open: On the local network, an attacker can answer LLMNR name lookups (for example with Responder) and collect password hashes. Link the GPO there too, or to a container above them.
Next: apply the same setting to the 10 computers it doesn't reach yet.
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 0. Low risk: apply it through a GPO, and check a few machines afterwards.
More notes (1)
- Devore gives the value explicitly. Turning LLMNR off removes one of the ways Responder-style adversary-in-the-middle attacks work.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Turn off multicast name resolution |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient\EnableMulticast |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-registry-pol |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 4 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | equals |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 0 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 6 gives the value 0. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
| Value found | Type | Rollout step | Set by GPO | Delivered by | Enforced link / link path |
|---|
0 | REG_DWORD | enforced | Sample Workstation LLMNR GPO
CN={44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from Registry.pol | administrative template (policy) | noOU=Workstations,DC=test,DC=local
|
Scan notes
- Group Policy sets this on 40 of 50 computers. The other 10 get no value from it, so they aren't configured. Not reached: OU=Servers,DC=test,DC=local (8), OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (2).
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 6
DEVORE-06-NBTNS-NODETYPE Disable NetBIOS-over-TCP name resolution (P-node)
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisLow risk
NetBIOS broadcast name lookups can be answered by an attacker on the local network, who then collects password hashes.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 2
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 2. Low risk: apply it through a GPO, and check a few machines afterwards.
More notes (1)
- Devore gives the value explicitly. Setting it through a GPO needs SecGuide.admx from the Security Compliance Toolkit.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | MS Security Guide: NetBT NodeType configuration (SecGuide.admx) |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NetBT\Parameters\NodeType |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-registry-pol |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 4 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | equals |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 2 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 6 gives the value 2 (P-node). |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- NodeType isn't set to P-node, so NetBIOS name resolution by broadcast is still on and can be spoofed.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 6
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-INCOMING Audit incoming NTLM traffic
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows which clients still use NTLM against this system, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (5)
- MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means some auditing is on, and 0 fails as auditing turned off. Microsoft lists the options but not their numbers, so whether it audits domain accounts or all accounts is shown in the evidence, not judged. Read the value found if you need to know.
- INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Disable' is stored as 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Disable'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
- WATCH OUT: some third-party write-ups mix up the Audit* and Restrict* values and say 2 here means 'deny all'. It doesn't. Microsoft says this audit policy doesn't block any traffic. Blocking is DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INCOMING, which isn't checked yet because no source gives its value.
- Rollout state 'enforced' here means the audit policy is fully set up, not that NTLM is blocked. Blocking is covered by the DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-* checks.
- Logs events 8002 and 8003 in Microsoft/Windows/NTLM/Operational.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit Incoming NTLM Traffic |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0\AuditReceivingNTLMTraffic |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 4 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | gte |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 1 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit incoming NTLM traffic' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-incoming-ntlm-traffic), lists the options (Disable / Enable auditing for domain accounts / Enable auditing for all accounts), says 'Not defined' is the same as Disable and audits nothing, and says the policy doesn't block any traffic. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Disable is stored as the numeric 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft says unset and Disable are the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact level is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the level would be mislabelled, but Disable still couldn't pass. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- Incoming NTLM auditing isn't set up, so there's no record of which clients still use NTLM against this system. Microsoft says 'Not defined' is the same as Disable, which audits no NTLM traffic.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 8
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-INDOMAIN Audit NTLM authentication in this domain (domain controllers)
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows NTLM use across the domain from the domain controllers, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (5)
- MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means some in-domain auditing is on, and 0 fails as auditing turned off. The policy has five options (Disable and four Enable scopes) and Microsoft doesn't publish their numbers, so which one is set is shown in the evidence, not judged. 'Enable all' is the one that records everything.
- INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Disable' is stored as 0 and the four Enable options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Disable'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
- WATCH OUT: this is an audit policy. Microsoft says it doesn't block any traffic; the deny options belong to DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAIN, which isn't checked yet. No value of this setting blocks NTLM.
- Rollout state 'enforced' here means this audit policy's target is met, not that in-domain NTLM is blocked. Blocking is covered by DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAIN.
- Logs events 8004, 8005 and 8006.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain |
|---|
| Registry key | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\AuditNTLMInDomain |
|---|
| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
|---|
| Scope | domain-controllers |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
|---|
| GPOs searched | 3 |
|---|
Expected (baseline)
| Operator | gte |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
|---|
| Final (enforced) | 1 |
|---|
| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-ntlm-authentication-in-this-domain), lists five options (Disable / Enable for domain accounts to domain servers / Enable for domain accounts / Enable for domain servers / Enable all), says Disable logs no events for incoming NTLM traffic, gives 'Not defined' as the default for every server type, and says the policy doesn't block traffic. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Disable is stored as the numeric 0 and the four Enable options as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft treats unset and Disable as the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact option is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the option would be mislabelled, but Disable still couldn't pass. With five options the level matters more here than for the other audit checks: only 'Enable all' records everything. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- In-domain NTLM auditing isn't set up on the domain controllers, so there's no record of NTLM use across the domain. Microsoft gives 'Not defined' as the default for every server type, and Disable logs no events.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 8
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING Audit outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows which systems still send NTLM to other servers, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
How to fix it, step by step
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (4)
- MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means outgoing NTLM is at least logged, and Allow all (0) fails. Which level is set (Audit all or Deny all) is shown in the evidence, not judged, because Microsoft doesn't publish the numbers.
- INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Allow all' is stored as 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Allow all'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
- One value controls both auditing and blocking of outgoing NTLM; see DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOING, which isn't checked yet because no source gives the number for Deny all. A pass here means at least audited. It doesn't mean outgoing NTLM is blocked.
- Rollout state 'enforced' here means this audit check's target is met, not that outgoing NTLM is denied.
Evidence and technical detail
| Policy | Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers |
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| Registry key | HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic |
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| Registry type | REG_DWORD |
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| Scope | all |
|---|
| Check type | gpo-security-template |
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| GPOs searched | 4 |
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Expected (baseline)
| Operator | gte |
|---|
| Interim (audit step) | — |
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| Final (enforced) | 1 |
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| Where the value comes from | Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-outgoing-ntlm-traffic-to-remote-servers), lists the options (Allow all / Audit all / Deny all) and says 'Not defined' is the same as Allow all. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Allow all is stored as the numeric 0 and the other two as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft says unset and Allow all are the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact level is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the level would be mislabelled, but Allow all still couldn't pass. A minimum can't tell Audit all from Deny all, so a pass here means 'at least audited', never 'blocked'. Blocking uses the same value and is DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOING, which isn't checked yet because it needs the exact number for Deny all. |
|---|
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
- Outgoing NTLM is neither audited nor restricted, so there's no record of outbound NTLM use, which you need before you can block it. Microsoft says 'Not defined' is the same as Allow all: the device allows all NTLM authentication requests.
- 1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Source: Devore AD Hardening Series, Part 8